Abstract
The main motivation for writing this paper is the lack of research in the area of so-called weak-form stock market effi ciency in Croatia. Although the Croatian stock market has existed for twenty years and has developed a solid infrastructure, the very low liquidity still places it in the emerging market category 1 . The fi rst steps in testing its effi ciency by measuring autocorrelation of returns started only recently (Barbić, 2010) . The objective of this paper is to supplement traditional statistical testing with the assessment of a chosen trading rule (trading system) and compare the results obtained on the Croatian market with fi ndings on a more developed equity market (U.S.). We used the same methodology in testing for socalled weak-form statistical and trading effi ciency on these two markets and found similar results: a surprisingly similar effi ciency before the recent crisis and a somewhat less surprising ineffi ciency in the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The analysis also revealed trading ineffi ciency, as it proved to be easy to fi nd a trading rule that beat the market.
A similar in(effi ciency) in capital markets as different as those in Croatia and the U.S. is not a puzzle if one takes into account a number of problems related with the design of empirical tests and interpretation of their results. The common denominator of numerous formulations of the Effi cient Market Hypothesis (EMH) is the idea that investors cannot beat the market in the long run. The market is considered effi cient if participants using all available information (including past pri-ce changes) cannot create strategies that consistently beat the average market returns. Many papers testing this main postulate of the EMH have been published. The usual procedure is to test for serial independence of stock price changes. Statistical serial independence of price changes (zero autocorrelation) implies that it is not possible to forecast future price changes using observed past prices changes. In this case, prices follow a "random walk" pattern -today's changes have no infl uence on tomorrow's price changes. However it remains puzzling whether some degree of statistical predictability of future on the basis of past returns is enough for investors (at least for "sophisticated traders") to be able to exploit this information profi tably.
Formulation of the weak-form market effi ciency condition based on the random walk model was dominant in economic thought until the 60s. However, Samuelson (1965) and Mandelbrot (1966) showed that price behavior associated with the martingale model rather than the random walk model is a better description of asset price movements in an informationally effi cient market. An implication of the martingale model is that a market can be effi cient even if there is correlation of successive price changes under the assumption that economic agents are risk averse (LeRoy, 1989) . The same implication follows from the rational expectations formulation of effi cient market theory (LeRoy, 1973; Lucas, 1978) . Also, one should not be surprised to detect serial correlation of changes in prices of financial instruments in informationally effi cient markets when there are large changes in exogenous variables such as income, wealth and/or attitudes towards risk.
2 However, the fi nding of serial independence of price changes is still an indication of market effi ciency.
Therefore statistical tests in the random walk tradition have weak theoretical foundations and are of dubious importance for market participants. No wonder that statisticians as well as some economists on one hand, and investors on the other, do not perceive market (in)effi ciency in the same way. For a market practitioner ineffi ciency is the existence of a winning trading system that consistently generates profi ts above the benchmark, which represents the market. However, there are weak theoretical foundations for this type of test, too.
Filter rules/mechanical trading systems are precise instructions about when to buy or sell a fi nancial instrument with the goal of achieving above-average profi ts. Tests of fi lter rules/mechanical trading systems have been performed for decades with varying successes (in terms of "beating" market indices). Interpretations of their results have varied even more than the results themselves. Some authors (e.g. Fama, 1965; Fama and Blume, 1966) interpreted the impossibility of beating the market in favor of the EMH, although they did not discuss how many trading rules are possible or the signifi cance of fi nding a rule or several rules that did not beat the market. Similarly, the discovery of a rule/trading system that beats the market average has no clear cut theoretical interpretation in terms of market (in)effi ciency as it is not clear how probable it is to fi nd such a rule by chance. Notwithstanding theoretical problems, such a fi nding catches the attention of stock traders. Given the theoretical limits described above, this paper provides a substantial body of descriptive statistical evidence about the functioning of the Croatian stock market (Zagreb Stock Exchange) in the period 1997-2010. Descriptive evidence is organized and interpreted within the theoretical tradition of market effi ciency. Given the numerous ambiguities that are present within this tradition 3 we urge readers to interpret the results critically. We hope we have provided guidance regarding caution in the interpretation of results throughout the paper.
The paper is divided into six sections. After the introduction, the second part gives an overview of the literature related to traditional market effi ciency testing, as well as research done on the effectiveness of various trading systems/fi lter rules. In the third section, data and methodology are described. The fourth section presents and interprets the results. The fi fth section discusses the problems with interpreting the results. Concluding remarks are found in the fi nal section. Fama (1965) tested for serial independence of Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) component price changes. He concluded that markets are effi cient, with prices behaving like a "random walk" although the distribution of price changes was not gaussian. Numerous researchers built upon his work. Earlier studies supported Fama's proposition, but most of the work conducted later, especially in the 80s on developed and emerging markets, questioned the serial independence of price changes. For example, Poterba and Summers (1988) examined the U.S. and seventeen other developed markets and found that returns were positively correlated in the short-term and negatively correlated in the long-term. This was backed up by Fama and French (1988) who found negative serial correlation of long-term returns. Lo and MacKinlay (1988) detected positive serial correlation of shortterm price changes (less than one year).
LITERATURE OVERVIEW
Although the outcome of these studies points to the presence of short-term trends and long-term mean-reversion in the stock markets, this ultimately did not lead to the formulation of usable trading strategies. A hint as to this was given by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) who concluded that stocks that had outperformed the market in the past 3 to 12 months tended to outperform the market in the following 3 to 12 months. While the performance of individual stocks remains highly unpredictable, the authors state that the market can be beaten by constructing portfolios of the best performing stocks in the recent past. Pesaran and Timmermann (1995) also observed return predictability that changes with time -it is higher in eco-nomically volatile periods (like the 1970s) and signifi cantly lower in economically relatively calm decades (like the 1960s and 1980s). 4 Similar outcomes were observed while testing emerging markets. Harvey (1994) and Claessens et al. (1995) conclude that emerging markets (with a heavy weighting of South American and Asian emerging markets) show signifi cant serial correlations of returns, indicating that serial correlation may indeed have some value as an indicator of market (in)effi ciency. Earlier studies of the new European emerging markets showed the ineffi ciency of the Polish stock market in the fi rst half of the 1990s (Nivet, 1997) , which was in contrast with fi ndings for the Hungarian market. According to Chun (2000) , it exhibited no predictability of returns although it was in its infancy in the 1990s. Mateus (2004) notices high serial correlation of returns on stock markets of the 13 new EU accession countries. Comparable fi ndings came from Cajueiro and Tabak (2006) , who observed short-and long-term predictability of returns on European transition markets. Barbić (2010) investigated the Croatian market and found some statistically signifi cant but unstable autocorrelation coeffi cients with low values that are hardly associated with meaningful trading strategies.
Simultaneously with testing for autocorrelation, academics and market practitioners tested the EMH by comparing the buy and hold strategy (which supposedly produces average market return) with fi lter rules/mechanical trading systems.
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The most popular mechanical trading systems are breakout and moving average crossover systems. One simple example of a breakout system is "buy when the price of a security breaks above its 10-day high and sell when the price falls 2% below its subsequent high". Moving average crossover systems are based on the assumption that when a short-term moving average (MA) crosses a longer-term MA from below one should buy because a new uptrend is about to be formed. The opposite should be done when the shorter MA crosses the longer from above, since a new downtrend is likely to emerge.
The main premise here is that if mechanical trading systems were consistently to outperform the market index, then market effi ciency could be challenged. Alexander (1961) , Fama (1965) , and Fama and Blume (1966) tested fi lter rules on the U.S. market and found that they cannot generate above-average trading profi ts. Van Horne and Parker (1967) chose 30 U.S. stocks at random and bought and sold them based on their price crossing the 200-, 150-and 100-day moving average. They found that none of the price-moving average combinations resulted in profi ts that could not be achieved by the simple buy and hold strategy. 4 Drifts in predictability are associated with different market regimes in bull (high return-low volatility) and bear (low return-high volatility) markets. It is very well documented that all correlations tend to increase in bear market regimes. See Kunovac (2011) for a useful review of the literature and results for the Croatian market. 5 Statistical tests of autocorrelation and the tests of trading rules/systems are not the only tests of EMH. Many event studies indicating violations of EMH gave birth to an astonishingly wide field of behavioural finance. A reader should look for surveys of behavioural finance elsewhere in the literature (e.g. Shefrin, 2002 301-326 (2011) 306 More recent studies give a different picture, though. Brock et al. (1992) tested various breakout and moving average crossovers systems on the DJIA from 1897 to 1986. They stated the superiority of technical trading systems over the buy and hold strategy. Buy and sell signals consistently generated returns higher than "normal" results. Kwon and Kish (2002) support the Brock et al. study using a sample of broader market-cap weighted indices like the NYSE and NASDAQ. They found that technical trading rules added value by capturing profi t opportunities when compared to a buy and hold strategy. Siegel's fi ndings (2002) are also intriguing: investment based on a long-term trading rule beat the NASDAQ Composite, and fared only slightly worse than the DJIA (but with signifi cantly lower risk).
Fifi eld et al. (2008) examined moving average rules for 15 emerging and 3 developed markets over the period of 1989-2003. Their results indicate that the return behavior of emerging markets differed markedly from that of their developed market counterparts; moving average rules were more profi table when tested using emerging stock market indices. In addition, this profi tability persisted for longer moving averages, suggesting that trends in stock returns were larger and more persistent in emerging markets. Jagric et al. (2005) tested fi ve Central European markets (Slovenia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic) and Russia on the effect the transition process had on the market effi ciency. They tested these markets with a technical trading system comprised of an MA crossover system (15-50 days) for trending periods and the Relative Strength Index (RSI) for sideways periods. 6 With the exception of Slovakia and Poland the mechanical trading system outperformed the buy and hold strategy.
The brief literature review presented here comprises only a small fraction of literarily hundreds of relevant studies, the sheer number ensuring that any attempt at comprehensiveness would be certain to fail. Instead, the main purpose of this review is to illustrate the diversity of the empirical fi ndings, which provide very few priors. This is hardly a surprise given the fact that theoretical underpinnings of informationally effi cient markets and their statistical tests are vague. In this respect, tests of serial correlations of price changes can be interpreted as effi ciency tests only under very restrictive conditions of random walk in stock prices, which is not considered to be a valid theory of asset price movements. Moreover, it implies risk neutrality and no signifi cant changes in exogenous variables such as income, wealth or risk-appetite, not to mention technological changes. For that reason, fi nding serial dependence does not lead to rejection of EMH. However, fi nding serial independence is an indication of effi ciency. Similarly, mechanical trading systems may be very interesting for market practitioners but there is no clear theoretical pathway showing how to interpret the implications of their results on market efficiency. Readers should bear this in mind while interpreting our results. Our test of market effi ciency of the Croatian stock market (Zagreb Stock Exchange -ZSE) rests on two pillars. The fi rst part of our market effi ciency test is the statistical test of autocorrelation. The second part is an attempt to fi nd a simple trading rule that would exceed returns of the stock index in the long run. We compared ZSE and NYSE with the use of both approaches.
STATISTICAL TEST OF AUTOCORRELATION OF RETURNS
For Croatia, the analysis was based on offi cial stock index data of the Zagreb Stock Exchange (CROBEX) from 2 January 1997 to 2 June 2010. Of interest here is the autocorrelation of changes in the value of the CROBEX market index. The analytical technique used in Lo (2004:23) was used to compare results for Croatia and the U.S. Lo's (2004) data for the U.S. comprise 133 years of monthly returns on the S&P 500 in the period from 1871 to 2003. He shows successive autocorrelation coeffi cients of investment returns on the U.S. stock exchange index Standard & Poor's (S&P 500) by fi xing the sample size to 60 months and successively moves ("rolls") the time sample towards the last -most recent monthly observation. As this is a 60-month forward moving sample, the fi rst observation of autocorrelation is in the 61 st month following the fi rst observation in the sample. Lo (2004) computed and plotted the fi rst-order autocorrelation for each sample. Based on the changes in autocorrelation coeffi cients for successive time periods he obtains a time series showing a "degree" of market effi ciency: the market is "less effi cient" if autocorrelation coeffi cients move further away from zero and vice versa.
Here we created a replica of Lo's (2004) results on the sample of data from 1876 to 2010, using Robert Shiller's (2010) database (fi gure 1). One sees a relatively high average autocorrelation of returns, ranging from 20% to 30%. Lo (2004) used this result to support the conclusion that the U.S. capital market is ineffi cient. Also, strong variations of the autocorrelation coeffi cient across time support his belief that market (in)effi ciency drastically changes over time. Lo (2004) considers that in more recent times market effi ciency quickly decreases (autocorrelation increases) after reaching effi ciency peak in 1997, as confi rmed by the data from the replica in fi gure 1 up to 2010. Large autocorrelation variations in the long run confi rm the idea developed in the adaptive market hypothesis (AMH) 7 tradition that structural changes appear in the market over long-term periods that may be related to changes in psychological characteristics of market participants (risk aversion), regulation, institutional infrastructure, wealth, technology, etc.
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FINANCIAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 35 (3) 301-326 (2011) 308 FIGURE 1 Autocorrelation coeffi cient of monthly returns on the S&P 500 index on the 60-month moving time sample from 1876 to 2010 (%) Sources: Lo (2004) , Shiller (2010) and authors' calculations.
It is of critical importance to distinguish "noise" from signifi cant variability of autocorrelation. It may be that only the most extreme upper and lower observations have some signifi cance. For that purpose, critical values for the two-sided test of statistical signifi cance of linear correlation coeffi cients are calculated by the following formula:
where N is the sample size, i.e. the number of observations in the period observed.
If the absolute value of the correlation coeffi cient exceeds the critical value, the autocorrelation is different from zero at the given signifi cance level.
In fi gure 1 above, the following four periods of effi ciency would be of interest at a statistical signifi cance level of 1% 9 The recent market situation also indicates ineffi ciency.
The fi rst observation for Croatia is in January 1997, so the calculation of autocorrelations begins 60 months later. One month is lost due to calculation of monthly changes and another one due to the shift of the fi rst order, so the relevant time period is March 2002 -May 2010, i.e. 98 monthly observations. The end of the month observation is taken as the data for that month.
8 Critical value at 5% significance level of the two-sided test is 25.3%. 9 Even a cursory look indicates the fact that inefficiency peaks are somehow linked to crises. 1901 1905 1909 1913 1917 1922 1926 1930 1934 1938 1942 1947 1951 1955 1959 1963 1967 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1997 2001 2005 2009 U.S. MARKET FINANCIAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 35 (3) 301-326 (2011) As far as daily data is concerned, in the period from 2 January 1997 to 2 June 2010, there were 3,335 trading days on the Zagreb Stock Exchange. In the same period, there were 3,466 trading days on the New York Stock Exchange. This difference in the sample size (3.9%) has no signifi cant bearing on the results. The fi rst 5-year sample (1,236 trading days) of daily data for Croatia comprises changes in the CROBEX from 3 January 1997 to 3 January 2002. We observed the correlation between daily changes over that time sample and daily changes in the period of the same duration moved forward by one day. Moving the time period of the same duration day by day until the last observation on 2 June 2010 ("rolling") provides a sequence of 2,100 autocorrelation coeffi cients for one-day lagged 2,100 sub-periods, i.e. time samples from 4 January 2002 to 2 June 2010. The percentage of 2,100 coeffi cients that exceeds critical values was observed. Critical values for the time sample of 1,236 observations are 7.3% at a signifi cance level of 1% and 5.6% at a signifi cance level of 5% of the two-sided test.
FILTER TEST / MECHANICAL TRADING SYSTEM
Moving averages are among the most popular technical analysis tools. Due to differences in the number of days entered in the calculation, there are in theory as many moving averages as there are investors. Still, stockcharts.com highlights the most popular ones: 5-20-day averages are most often used to present short-term market trends, 50-day averages are used for medium-term trends and 200-day moving averages are used to determine long-term trends.
In addition to simple moving averages in which all prices have the same weight, market participants use the exponential moving average (EMA):
where P t is today's price, N is the number of days for which the exponential moving average is calculated and K is the weight of the most recent observation:
The most recent price, which enters the calculation last, has the greatest weight in calculation of averages, while the oldest price has the least weight. This is why EMA refl ects the current situation in the market more objectively than simple moving averages where the oldest and the most recent price receive the same weight. So far, it has not been proved beyond doubt that the use of exponential moving averages is more profi table that the use of simple averages. Still, the more logical assumption that more recent prices are more relevant in securities trading than older prices prevailed in the selection of the method. This is the main reason why exponential moving averages are used.
There are several basic ways of using moving averages for the purpose of securities trading (Murphy, 1999) : (a) buy when the price exceeds the chosen moving average, and sell when its price falls below the moving average; (b) buy when the chosen moving average turns up, and sell when the chosen moving average turns down (Elder, 2002) ; and (c) buy when the shorter moving average (e.g. 20-day) crosses above the longer moving average (e.g. 50-day), and sell when the shorter moving average crosses below the longer moving average (moving averages crossing). The time horizon of an investment based on moving averages depends on the chosen length of moving averages: the shorter the moving averages, the shorter expected period of investment, and vice versa. For example, a trading based on the crossover of the 10-day moving average generates a signal to buy/sell every few days, while the approach applied to a 200-day moving average results in only several transactions a year. The CROBEX and S&P 500 were tested using the moving average crossover strategy, where the 50-day EMA was taken as the shorter moving average and the 200-day EMA was used as the long-term moving average (50/200 EMA). The moving averages were selected with the intent to create a trading system that will rarely give signals to buy/sell and thus keep an investor within the prevalent trend for as long as possible. This combination, while generally accepted among market participants and often used in determining long-term trends in the market (Carr, 2008) is not prominently covered in the listed academic research.
The simulations were run by using MetaStock version 10.1 (Equis International) software. The testing period begins on 2 September 1997 and ends on 2 September 2010 (a total of 3,250 trading days). Initial capital is 100,000 monetary units (mu). The trading system manages the funds according to the following rules: (a) when the 50-day moving average crosses above the 200-day moving average, total capital is invested in the CROBEX at the opening price on the fi rst day after the crossing (if the opening price is not available in the system, the closing price on the fi rst day after the crossing is used); (b) when the 50-day moving average crosses below the 200-day moving average, the whole position is sold at the opening price on the fi rst day after the crossing (if the opening price is not available in the system, the closing price on the fi rst day after the crossing is used); (c) purchase and sale transaction costs are equal to 1% of the current portfolio value; (d) in periods when not invested in the market, the investor earns an average annual rate of 3% on cash. The trading system allows only for the entire portfolio to be exposed to equity risk or the entire portfolio to be returned to the neutral position (cash). Real strategies can be much more complex. For example, a partial portfolio exposure to stocks and partial holding of cash is possible. Such strategies are not analyzed as they cannot provide a clear picture of superiority over the market average. Also, it is possible to exclude a neutral cash position and analyze the strategy of continuous two sided exposure to equity. This strategy is subject to errors in both directions and yields a much poorer result than the neutral position strategy.
U.S. MARKET FINANCIAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 35 (3) 301-326 (2011) Although the period of the last 14 years represents a "large sample" in statistical terms, when concluding on the validity of trading rules the size of the sample cannot be defi ned by the same method as one would decide on the sample size to conclude on probabilities in coin tossing or another phenomenon whose "drawings" are random. In this case it is known that the nature of serial dependence varies across time. This means that longer historical periods may have unique characteristics, which market participants have to learn during the periods themselves. These structural characteristics of the market change from time to time, thereby changing the rules of the game. Learning then starts from the beginning. In this light, a hypothesis may be proposed that the rule will fi nd it much harder (if at all) to beat the market over an extended period of time since that time framework includes structurally different periods during which there are learning cycles and the winning strategies change. This is why the S&P 500 index was used to test the moving average crossover system in the period from 3 January 1950 to 2 September 2010 (a total of 15,266 trading days). 1997 27.6.1997 18.11.1997 14.4.1998 4.9.1998 27.1.1999 23.6.1999 12.11.1999 7.4 1997 27.6.1997 18.11.1997 14.4.1998 4.9.1998 27.1.1999 23.6.1999 12.11.1999 7.4 10 Then U.S. market becomes ineffi cient (statistically signifi cant positive serial correlation of price changes) for a very short period in 2007 (see the local peak in 2007) and then both markets became ineffi cient after Lehman Brothers collapse as coeffi cients rose at about 30%. It is striking that two such different markets produce such similar time series of autocorrelation coeffi cients at monthly frequencies:
11 the linear correlation coeffi cient of time series of autocorrelation coeffi ci ents in Croatia and the U.S. for the 2002-2010 period stands at a very high 73.6% for monthly price changes.
The result indicating large similarities in (in)effi ciency of two extremely different capital markets may be considered a puzzle. The usual assumption is that the U.S. market, which is several thousand times more liquid than the Croatian market (not to mention the longevity, institutional structure and experience of participants), should be much more effi cient. Numerous empirical studies of both developing and developed countries confi rmed such a relationship, the literature mainly discussing whether a lower degree of institutional development and liquidity (i.e. higher market risk in developing countries) may account for a higher return on investment in stocks listed on these markets (Barbić, 2010) .
On the other hand, if one remembers that Lo (2004) was also surprised by the fact that the New York Stock Exchange today may not be as effi cient as in some periods 15, 50, 100 and even more years ago, the result of the comparison between Croatia and the U.S. should not come as a surprise. There are market processes in force that in the long run considerably change the statistical characteristics of stock price time series. These processes also signifi cantly change the relationship between effi ciency of different markets -regardless of the degree of their development. Unfortunately, which processes are in force and how they create changes 10 A figure with daily data, not given here, is very similar. It also shows rapid transitions of autocorrelation characteristics of time series of monthly price changes. Notice that the Croatian monthly time series exhibits two additional periods of rapid transitions: one in 2003 (increase) and another in 2005 (decrease). Also note that the presented autocorrelation coefficient of monthly returns is significantly different from zero: on the 60-month sample, significance of the difference from zero at the level of 1% is achieved with a coefficient value of 33.2%; for the 5% significance level, the critical value is 25.3%, while for the 10% significance the critical value is 21.2%. 11 This is in line with Kunovac's (2011) finding about increase of both intra-market and inter-market correlations in bear periods. (2011) 313 remains ambiguous. However, it is known that shifts in risk preferences (risk aversion) could be one of their main determinants (Pesaran, 2010) . Sources: Zagreb Stock Exchange (2010) , Lo (2004) , Shiller (2010) and authors' calculations.
FIGURE 3 Autocorrelation coeffi cients of monthly returns on the CROBEX and S&P 500 indexes on the 60-month moving time samples from March 2002 to May 2010 (%)
In this particular case, one may assume that events during the crisis of 2008-2009 played a key role in generating similarities between the two markets. Common exogenous shocks spreading over the complex system of globally interconnected capital markets caused similar changes in autocorrelation characteristics of price changes in distant markets. Excluding from observation the crisis period from August 2007 on, the linear correlation coeffi cient of successive autocorrelation coeffi cients in Croatia and the U.S. falls to 24% from March 2002 to July 2007, confi rming that similarities arose in the crisis period only. A similar result is obtained by calculating a simple correlation of monthly returns. The linear correlation coeffi cient of monthly returns on the CRO-BEX and S&P 500 indices is twice as high in the overall period as that in pre-crisis period: it was 62% in the period from February 1997 to May 2010 and, when the crisis period is excluded and the period up to July 2007 included, it stands at 31%. This fi nding, however, does not solve the whole puzzle. In the pre-crisis period, the autocorrelation coeffi cient for monthly data moved close to zero in Croatia. As a rule, it did not exceed 10%. In the light of critical values, this means that the Croatian market was effi cient at monthly frequencies. In the same period, the autocorrelation moved around 15% in the U.S., with much smaller variations in successive time periods. Accepting the thesis that the monthly autocorrelation coeffi cient represents a measure of (in)effi ciency, one may conclude that the Croatian market was nearly as effi cient as the U.S. market in the decade preceding the crisis. (2011) Here we urge the reader to recall our introductory discussion on market (in)effi ciency. Correlation of successive price changes can be interpreted as a measure of (in)effi ciency under the restrictive assumption that an effi cient market is represented by a random walk. When this assumption is relaxed (by introducing the martingales and/or rational expectations defi nition of effi cient market), an autocorrelation different from zero may emerge in an informationally effi cient market. What happened after collapse of Lehman Brothers in both markets is neither a surprise nor a sign that the market became ineffi cient. What is surprising is the absence of autocorrelation before the autumn of 2007 on the Zagreb Stock Exchange. It points to the fact that an even underdeveloped market may be effi cient.
Intriguing results obtained on monthly data called for a test on daily data (table 1) .
For CROBEX, the autocorrelation coeffi cient of daily price changes exceeds the critical value at the level of 1% in 809 days or 38.5% of the total number of days in the sample. At the 5% level, the critical threshold is exceeded in 962 days or 45.8% of the total number of days in the sample. These are strong indications of ineffi ciency for the whole period -same result as with monthly price changes. 301-326 (2011) Excluding the crisis period following 1 August 2007, the coeffi cient exceeds the critical value at the level of 1% in 128 days or 9.2% of the total number of days, while the number of days when the critical value is exceeded at the 5% signifi cance level increases to 281 days or 20.1% of the sample. The result is different for the pre-crisis compared with the whole period: at a suffi ciently high level of statistical stringency; the number of successive time periods with the autocorrelation coeffi cient different from zero is reduced to below one-tenth. It is diffi cult to conclude whether this result means that the Croatian capital market was ineffi cientparticularly in view of the fact that coeffi cients are very small and, as a rule, do not exceed 15%. Taken together, two pieces of information (marginal statistical signifi cance and size of coeffi cient not exceeding 15%) were hardly useful for stock traders. Accordingly, we conclude that daily data do not strongly contradict the fi nding obtained on monthly data that the Zagreb Stock Exchange represented by CROBEX was an effi cient capital market prior to recent crisis.
However, the U.S. capital market was very effi cient in the pre-crisis period as only 1.1% and 0.6% respectively of coeffi cients exceeded critical value (in addition, coeffi cient values did not exceed 2% over the 2003-2007 cycle) . The percentage of observations above critical value rises to over 20% when the crisis period is included in the observation. A comparison of these results with those of Lo (2004) leads to the conclusion that it is much more diffi cult to discover autocorrelation of returns on daily data than on monthly data.
TRADING TEST: RULE
The notion that a market is to some extent ineffi cient in statistical terms has no useful application if this supposed ineffi ciency cannot be used for profi t. On the other hand, there is no widely accepted theoretical guidance regarding implications for market effi ciency if one fi nds a profi table trading rule. Notwithstanding theoretical problems, fi nding profi table trading rules provides intriguing information for both academics and market practitioners.
To date there has been no disclosure of any practicable investment strategy and/or trading system that would yield above-average profi ts in the Croatian capital market. However, the remainder of this paper will show that it is relatively easy to establish and disclose a trading rule that can beat the market and we hope to provide a plausible explanation why is this possible in section 5.
In the brief literature overview, it was pointed out that more recent research found many trading systems that beat the market using past data. Also, better results were achieved by using longer-term trading systems than short-term trading strategies. The problem of short-term trading systems (apart from signifi cant transaction costs) is that they operate at extremely high levels of noise. The shorter the observation period, the greater is the "noise". This is particularly valid at intra-day and daily intervals (Elder, 2002) . Over longer time horizons, noise becomes smaller and the picture becomes clearer. Long-term trading systems/rules are created with intent to obtain many fewer trading signals (to diminish transaction costs), so as to keep investors in harmony with the dominant trend for as long as possible. Long-term systems want to take the best from the buy and hold strategy -participation in the periods of stock price growth and avoidance of the worst -occasional sharp falls in portfolio value.
The results and a graphical presentation of the simulation of 50/200 EMA trading rule on CROBEX are shown in table 2 and fi gure 4. Results are interesting, to say the least. Using a simple and generally-known trading rule, the hypothetical investor considerably exceeded the return of the Croatian stock market. The initial capital of 100,000 monetary units increased to 291,088 in thirteen years, while the corresponding investment in the CROBEX ended the same period with the portfolio value of only 165,632. Annual returns were 8.56% and 3.95% respectively. The system beat the CROBEX not only with regard to return; not less important is the fact that it was achieved at much less risk. The system was invested in the market for only 1,996 of the total 3,250 days or 61.41% of the overall period. It thereby evaded the major portion of losses during the bear market years (1998-1999 and 2008-2009 ) with timely entries and long-enough presence during the bull market years (2000-2002 and 2004-2008) . The only weakness of the system is the generation of a relatively large number of false signals -fi ve out of the total seven trades ended with a loss. However, the average profi t from good signals (135,576) was several times higher than the average loss on false signals (21,977). In thirteen years, the system gave no more than two false signals in a row. The logical next step is the test of the same trading system on the most developed stock market in the world -the U.S. market. It is somewhat surprising that this simple trading system in the most liquid stock market in the world decisively defeated the buy and hold strategy, i.e. the market average (table 3 and fi gure 5).
Results are even more impressive than those for Croatia because there were only fi ve trades of which only two trades were unprofi table and there were no two "false" signals in a row in thirteen years. Once again, there is a huge difference in profi t in favor of the system relative to the index (274.60%) made at signifi cantly lower risk -exposure to the stock market risk accounted for only 60% of the total time. This resulted in avoidance of the two sharpest drops in the value in U.S. stock exchanges following the Great Depression -the bear markets of the 2000-2002 and the 2008-2009 period, when the S&P 500 index slumped by 49% and 56% respectively.
This fi nding is very important for the subject discussed here: market cycles from the 1990s on had the largest amplitudes since the Great Depression (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) (1933) . Long-term moving averages are ideal instruments for riding these long-term trends. Moving averages, however, are not nearly as good tools if the market does not move in a clearly defi ned trend, i.e. when the market moves sideways for a long time. 12 In that case, the moving average system creates nume- 1,183.87, 1,185.46, 1,179.70, 1,183.26, -0.52002) U.S. MARKET FINANCIAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 35 (3) 301-326 (2011) rous "false" signals, which generate many small losses in a row. Looking at historical stock price charts going back several decades, one sees many periods when the market moved sideways for months, even years (most notably, the 1966-82 period).
When the testing period is expanded to several decades (table 4), the buy and hold strategy fi nally gains advantage over attempts to time entries and exits from the market: the closing value of the market portfolio is 6.4 million monetary units vs. 5.2 million monetary units made using the moving averages crossing. The trading system's profi t is almost one-fi fth smaller (19.20%) than that of the index. Two conclusions arise: (a) a thorough verifi cation of trading system's validity must be based on longer time series; and (b) in the long run, the EMH (the buy and hold strategy) wins -if one disregards the risk. The trading system is indeed less profi table for investors, but that profi t is earned with much less risk: an investor is rather whimsically (a good illustration is the CROBEX movement from 2002 to 2004). In such periods, the buy and hold strategy is not likely to show great returns, but neither will it show big losses. On the other hand, the use of moving averages in the same period will cause frequent market entries and exits in futile attempts to catch trends that never form. Although these losses are relatively small, if the market is without a trend for a longer period of time, small individual losses may eventually turn to a large one.
exposed to the stock market risk only 71.51% of the time. What that practically means is that the investor was kept safe of the most vicious bear markets of the second part of the 20 th and early 21 st century -1969-70, 1973-74, 2000-02 and 2008-09 , as well as numerous minor ones 13 . The price paid for this insurance is the occasional trading "whipsaw" which in time compounds to a somewhat lower profi t than the buy and hold strategy.
DISCUSSION ON PROBLEMS WITH INTERPRETING THE RESULTS
Strikingly similar changes in autocorrelation of successive changes in stock prices in Zagreb and New York do not represent a surprise. Risk aversion and changes in risk attitudes can produce autocorrelation of price changes. This does not imply that changes in risk preferences can explain every situation of ambiguity involving theoretical priors and empirical results.
14 For example, the speed of learning of sophisticated traders is an issue of critical importance for the interpretation of empirical results but is only weakly refl ected in the literature. If sophisticated traders emerge in every market (which equals an assumption that there are always some smart people around) and if only a few of them are strong enough to move the market toward the state of effi ciency, statistical similarities between Croatian and U.S. capital markets in the period before the crisis would hardly look surprising. Although it has been more than 30 years since the seminal contribution of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) , we still do not know much about the costs of information acquisition and their impact on market processes, not to mention their relations to the speed of learning.
Our analysis of the 50/200 EMA trading rule provokes an additional question about the nature and speed of learning. Recall that our trading rule, which beat the CROBEX, generated seven trades of which fi ve were losing ones and only two were profi table. Absolute return on profi table trades was much higher than absolute return on losing trades, so the strategy won against the market index. What kind of learning, preferences and investment horizons are required for an investor to stick with a winning trading rule 50/200 EMA in the long run? Two loss making trades occurred in a row, so one can try to put oneself in the shoes of an investor who invests with a mutual fund whose manager sticks with the rule, but after 2 or 3 years has nothing to show but two loss making trades. An optimal reaction in this case may be liquidating the investment. Also, recall the results from table 4: the EMA 50/200 trading system lost against the buy and hold S&P 500 strategy 13 The only exception here is the crash of 1987 which happened so fast that the long-term oriented system had not enough time to adapt. 14 In the last decade, a large body of literature has been developed attempting to model stock price behavior within a system populated by different types of agents (see e.g. Brock, Hommes and Wagener, 2005; and Verbič, 2008) . This literature is important as it allows modelling the market as a complex eco-system populated by different types of actors who initially have different risk preferences that change in different ways. The origins of this strand of literature can be traced back to Black's (1986) idea of "noise traders". Interactions of different types of traders (e.g. Black's noise traders and Fama's sophisticated traders) can produce complex dynamics of asset prices. For example Shefrin (2002) showed that sophisticated traders may abstain from trading even when they see a profit opportunity if they assess that risks increased. This may create closed loops reflected in sharp and clear trends as Fama's sophisticated traders stop acting and bubbles are formed. from 1950 to 2010, but who is the investor for whom 60 years represents a relevant investment horizon? Hence, the "discovery" of winning trading systems can be criticized from the perspective of the "benefi t of hindsight": there is no guarantee that a trading system that was superior in the past would continue to generate the same result in the future. By the same token, there is no guarantee that a superior trading system could be found (except by chance) in the past. In other words, public disclosure of a superior trading system (as is the case in this paper) is always connected to the following question: would it have been so superior if discovered earlier and could it have been discovered earlier except by chance in the fi rst place? These questions are obviously linked with the learning problem: how do market agents learn in real time? It seems that focus of fi nancial theory on information sets came at the expense of lesser focus on actual learning processes. Perhaps more could be learned about market (in)effi ciency by directly observing the actual learning processes of market participants than from observing stock price time series and charts.
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Relevant investment horizons, costs of information acquisition and speed of learning are closely related with institutional investors' constraints. EMH and its empirical tests usually forget that the most powerful investors are institutionally organized. Financial intermediaries exist, inter alia, for the purpose of intermediating between clients with various preferences regarding risk and time. Sophisticated traders are often leveraged and/or managing other people's money. Both constrain their choices. For example, a fund manager -a strong believer in the 50/200 EMA trading system, may be driven out of the market by clients who withdraw their money from her fund if she makes two loss making trades in the fi rst couple of years of operations. So, even if sophisticated trader is able to learn superior rules, maybe her investors cannot follow. It may take a long time for such a sophisticated trader to earn her own capital and/or credibility to convince other sophisticated investors that she has a winning trading strategy. In the meantime, technicians and fi nancial market specialists may continue to discover superiority of the EMA 50/200 trading rule and interpret this as indication of an ineffi cient market, while in reality this market may be effi cient for given risk and time preferences as well as distribution of investors' knowledge.
Generally, the less market participants are regulated and exposed to fi nancial leverage (the more they manage own capital), the better their position to use occasional opportunities that appear in the market due to institutional limitations if they are knowledgeable enough to spot such opportunities and if their risk aversion does not prevent exploitation of such opportunities. 16 Focus on institutional behavior and organization of sophisticated traders may provide deeper insight into the context of market effi ciency than a focus on movements in market prices.
Finally, note that we obtained different results in statistical tests vs. trading rules: statistical tests show market effi ciency in the pre-crisis period (in the case of Croatia more convincingly on monthly than on daily data) while the trading rule reveals market in(effi ciency) in both Croatia and U.S. throughout the whole period under investigation. However, the autocorrelation test ignores the fact that the equity market is only one among many interconnected fi nancial markets. The trading rule's test explicitly allows for portfolio shifts but of very limited nature (there are two assets: equity and cash). Having this in mind, Ball (1978) , following Fama (1976) , observed that in a partial analysis it is impossible to know whether one tests the empirical strategy itself or the EMH. At the current stage of development of the theory and empirical tests, then, it is diffi cult to state much more on market effi ciency, given empirical approach which we adopted in our work.
CONCLUSION
Both the Zagreb Stock Exchange and NYSE recorded signifi cant deviations of the autocorrelation coeffi cient from zero at monthly frequencies, with noticeably large variations of the autocorrelation coeffi cient of price changes across time. The analysis of autocorrelation at daily frequencies shows that both markets are ineffi cient in statistical terms but the conclusion differs for the pre-crisis period when the U.S. market appears to be effi cient, while it is impossible to prove the inefficiency of the Croatian market with a high level of confi dence. Moreover, a relatively small value of the autocorrelation coeffi cient of price changes indicates a level of market ineffi ciency that was probably negligible from a traders' perspective.
The simple moving average crossover trading rule beats the CROBEX index decisively in the 1997-2010 period, but with more losses than gains. The overall profi t of the trading system is generated thanks to profi ts that are several-fold higher than losses in absolute terms. The result suggests market ineffi ciency, but it is methodologically questionable whether an ex post established trading rule could have been established ex ante in real time.
The trading rule based on moving average gains a crucial advantage over the market average in long periods of downward trending prices, which are also periods of statistical ineffi ciency and increase in risk aversion. If the occurrence of statistical dependence of price changes can be explained by rising risk aversion, the results of the trading rules analysis are compatible with those of the traditional 16 Regulation and leverage obviously limit the set of possible transactions as they reduce the amount of risk that can be taken per unit of exposure and/or transaction. statistical analysis. Hence no wonder that the same trading system credibly beats the S&P 500 index in the same observed period (from 1997 to 2010), which is characterized by clear trends. However, the success ratio of the system relative to the market average is not clear over a very long period. Results achieved by the system from 1950-2010 were lower than those obtained from holding the S&P 500 index but they came with signifi cantly lower risk.
In conclusion, statistical and trading rule analyses do not yield conclusive results regarding market effi ciency.
